WORLD – (Times Media Service) When history is tracked, once all this is over and done with, Russia being locked out of SWIFT will be marked as a turning point.
Nothing like this has ever happened. Large-scale mostly-automated economic systems are not something that really widely existed before the modern day, and especially not in the context that they do now. Really, a conflict of the nature of the Ukrainian-Russian war hasn’t happened period: there are comparisons, parallels, but it is unique. The international reaction has been similarly unique, countries cutting Russia out of a variety of trade and economic engagement, the significance of which has already reared its head in a multitude of ways.
Partly to maintain its own propaganda measures against that of the Ukraine and the armchair generals of the West, Russia has nearly cut itself off from the wider capital-I Internet, forming their own lower-case-I internet in the process. Russia has put into place its own systems, its own methods of determining which sites are legitimate, pulling away from the international state of things which has existed for near two decades. This separation of data networks is worrying, and many fear that this is a signal of more nations beginning to turn inwards in their data networks- the death of the world wide web, as it slowly turns into a large number of smaller, internally-restricted and easier to monitor systems.
Of course, the Internet doesn’t matter so much if you don’t have anything to run it on. The legacy of the 2014 sanctions, now combined with the new wave of 2022, have drastically restricted Russian trade. This matters, of course, because Russia- like any modern country- is not self-sufficient in terms of manufacturing, minerals, components or machines. This means that the overall shortage of semiconductors that has plagued the world’s markets is now critical within Russia’s borders: electronic components have already skyrocketed in price, where they haven’t vanished entirely.
There is another edge to this, of course. The 2014 sanctions most definitely began the issues Russia now faces, and a large part of that can be seen in the deployment of the Russian armed forces. When experts, both Western and Eastern, were asked to envision a ground conflict with Russian forces before the Ukrainian conflict, it was characterized by a nation with modern and highly-developed armaments. Come the actual conflict, however, such things are nowhere to be seen.
But why? Russia developed an entire new line of tanks set to be mass-manufactured in 2015, much more modern than the aging T-90’s that characterize the Ukrainian conflict. And yet, none of them are seen anywhere on the battlefield- indeed, Russia seems to be working its way backwards, throwing older and older Soviet equipment into the front. In fact, more and more of Russia’s warfighting capability seems to be relying on old Soviet stockpiles of munitions and vehicles. Vehicles and munitions that have performed terribly against the Ukrainian resistance they face, who are armed with much more modern weaponry, easily capable of dealing with what they’re facing- the source of the frankly bewildering difference of losses between the Ukrainians and Russia.
The sanctions unequivocally kneecapped Russian military development and manufacturing. The new tanks Russia intended to roll off of manufacturing lines in 2015 was all but halted in its production because they couldn’t source the machines or components necessary to make them. But this didn’t stop at military development, extending into more civilian applications.
Many vehicles in Russia are foreign-manufactured, and even those that are domestically sourced still rely on foreign-made machines and parts. Due to the poor state of roads between major Russian population centers, the primary method of long distance travel is via trains, which use train cars manufactured using cassette bearings, which are only produced in three factories in Russia. All three of these factories rely on foreign imports to continue functioning. Russia has seized a large number of planes, in fact practically every plane within their boarders, but the lifespans of planes produced both domestically and internationally is less than six months, as parts fail and need to be replaced from dwindling stocks.
Sugar is another area where Russia is entirely reliant on international imports. Hoarding of stocks of sugar has already begun, and though much of it is on the expected individual level, what is truly shocking is that much of it is being done by entire regions under the direction of their governors.
Putin is an untouchable figure, the Tsar that rules Russia. The governors of Russian provinces, however, are very much not: they are both much more accessible to the people they rule, and much less protected by propaganda. If the situation in Russia worsens even further, the governors will find themselves at the business end of the ire of the people, and they know it. Because of this, the provinces appear to have universally decided that it’s every man for themselves: shipments are being stopped, supplies are being stockpiled. The individual regional sections of Russia are doing what’s best for themselves, at the expense of everyone else.
The economic separatism of this might be the death knell of Russia. With Russia’s armed forces devastated and armed with old Soviet weaponry, it might very well be that regions will break away, first economically as they are doing now, and then politically. Irregardless, the knock-on effects of all of this will echo, both nationally and internationally, for decades to come.
Alexander Murphy / Tech Writer (Times Media Service)
amurphy@timesmediaservice.com
